Category: Security

Another day, another end-of-support announcement for a product: On July 14, 2015, Windows Server 2003 (WS2003) goes out of support.
Poof! Over. That’s the bad news.
What’s the upside? Well, there isn’t really an upside, but you should rest assured that it won’t stop working. Systems won’t crash, and software won’t stop running.
From the standpoint of security, however, the implications are rather more dramatic.
For starters, this automatically means that anyone running WS2003 will be noncompliant with PCI security standards. So if your business falls under these restrictions – and if your business accepts any credit cards, it certainly does – the clock is ticking. Loudly.
There’ll be no more security patches, no more technical support and no more software or content updates after July 14, 2015. Most importantly, this information is public. Hackers typically target systems they know to be out of support. The only solution, really, is to upgrade Windows Server 2003 today.
TxMQ consultants report that a large percentage of our customers’ systems are running on Windows Server, and some percentage of our customers are still on WS2003. There are no terms strong enough terms to reinforce the need to get in touch with TxMQ, or your support vendor, for an immediate plan to upgrade Windows Server 2003 and affected systems.
Server migrations oftentimes take up to 90 days, while applications can take up to 2 months. Frankly, any business running WS2003 doesn’t have 60 days to upgrade, let alone 90. So please make a plan today for your migration/upgrade.

The announcement came yesterday: Chinese hackers had breached the federal government’s personnel office. In isolation, this might seem a single event. But when viewed in the grouping of several other top-level hacks, it becomes clear that the federal government is extremely vulnerable.
One clear parallel was the recent IRS Get Transcript breach, announced in late May, which is believed to trace to the Soviet Union. The information was taken from an IRS website called Get Transcript, where taxpayers can obtain previous tax returns and other tax filings. In order to access the information, the thieves cleared a security screen that required detailed knowledge about each taxpayer, including their Social Security number, date of birth, tax-filing status and street address. The IRS believes the criminals originally obtained this information from other sources. They were accessing the IRS website to get even more information about the taxpayers, which would help them claim fraudulent tax refunds in the future. Might the information in the more recent hack also provide the fuel for a future hack? Quite likely, in my opinion.
What’s especially bothersome to me is the IRS had received several warnings from GAO in 2014 and 2015. If the warnings had been implemented, there would have been less of an opportunity for the attack. The IRS failed to implement dozens of security upgrades to its computer systems, some of which could have made it more difficult for hackers to use an IRS website to steal tax information from 104,000 taxpayers.
In addition, the IRS has a comprehensive framework for its cybersecurity program, which includes risk assessment for its systems, security-plan development, and the training of employees for security awareness and other specialized topics. However, the IRS did not correctly implement aspects of its program. The IRS faces a higher statistical probability of attacks, but was unprepared. Let’s face it: The US federal government is a prime target for hackers.
The concern here, of course, is the grouping of attacks and the reality that the US government must be more prepared. I’ve managed IT systems and architecture for more than 3 decades and I’ll say this: The IRS testing methodology wasn’t capable of determining whether the required controls were in effective operation. This speaks to not only physical unpreparedness, but a general passive attitude toward these types of events and the testing protocols. The federal government doesn’t adequately protect the PII it collects on all US citizens, and simply sending a letter to those impacted by a breach is not enough to prevent recurrence in the future.
I don’t need to tell you that. The GAO told the IRS the same thing: “Until IRS takes additional steps to (1)address unresolved and newly identified control deficiencies and (2)effectively implements elements of its information security program, including, among other things, updating policies, test and evaluation procedures, and remedial action procedures, its financial and taxpayer data will remain unnecessarily vulnerable to inappropriate and undetected use, modification, or disclosure.”
These shortcomings were the basis for GAO’s determination that IRS had a significant deficiency in internal control over financial-reporting systems prior to the IRS Get Transcript Breach.
Author Note: In my next blog on security, I’ll talk about the NIST standard for small businesses, with recommendations to prepare and protect in the wake of these high-level breaches.
(Photo by Ray Tsang)

By TxMQ Middleware Architect Gary Dischner
No surprise to hear of yet another breach occurring – this time at Premera Blue Cross. The company became aware of a security breach on Jan. 29, 2015, but didn’t begin to notify anyone involved (including the state insurance board) until March 17, which was 6 weeks later. The actual attack took place in May 2014 and may affect 11 million customer records dating back to 2002.
As with many companies that experience a security breach, the excessive delays in first identifying and confirming that a breach has occurred, coupled with the typical delays in assessing and providing notification, subsequently led the state insurance board to fault Premera with untimely notification. A review of the HIPAA regulations for breach reporting indicates that a notification of those impacted absolutely needs to occur within 60 days. Many companies, including Premera, just aren’t equipped with the tools and security-management processes to handle these incidents. For Healthcare companies, HIPAA guidelines state that notification to the state insurance commissioner should be immediate for breaches involving more than 500 individuals. Consequently, Premera is now being sued by the state insurance commissioner.
A company found guilty of late notification should concern the public: There’s at least the appearance of a general lack of concern over both the impact and severity to its customers, partners and constituents. Blue Cross Premera has responded to its own behavior with efforts to protect itself and to cover up details of the incident, rather than be forthright with information so that those impacted can take the needed steps to protect themselves from further exposure and potential consequences, such as fraud and identify theft.
A secondary concern is the lack of security-management measures around protected data at many companies. In this case, the audit recommendations – which had been provided to Premera on Nov. 28, 2014 – found serious infractions in each of the following domains:

• Security management
• Access controls
• Configuration management
• Segregation of duties
• Contingency planning
• Application controls specific to Premera’s claims-processing systems
• HIPAA compliance

More and more companies are being reminded of the data exposures and related risks, but remain slow to respond with corrective measures. Companies of high integrity will take immediate responsive measures and will openly express concern for the repercussions of the exposure. Companies that do not? They should be dealt with severely. Let this Premera example serve as the Anthem breach for companies that are holding sensitive data. As a customer or business partner, let them know you expect them to take every measure to protect your healthcare and financial information.
And in closing, let’s all take away a few lessons learned. Security assessments must become a regular operational function. Self-audits demonstrate a company’s high integrity and commitment to identifying process improvements for security management. Such efforts should be assessed quarterly with reports to the company board to make sure every vulnerability is remediated and customers who are working with the company are protected. After all, it’s only the company that can secure its own technical environments.
Photo by torbakhopper